University of Dayton

eCommons
Physics Faculty Publications

Department of Physics

2007

Revisiting Hafemeister’s ‘Science and Society’ Tests
Robert J. Brecha
University of Dayton, rbrecha1@udayton.edu

Rex L. Berney
University of Dayton, rberney1@udayton.edu

Bruce A. Craver
University of Dayton, bcraver1@udayton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phy_fac_pub
Part of the Engineering Physics Commons, and the Other Physics Commons
eCommons Citation
Brecha, Robert J.; Berney, Rex L.; and Craver, Bruce A., "Revisiting Hafemeister’s ‘Science and Society’ Tests" (2007). Physics Faculty
Publications. 22.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phy_fac_pub/22

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Physics at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Physics Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu, mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

Revisiting Hafemeister’s science and society tests
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We revisit a series of papers on science and society issues by David Hafemeister in the 1970s and
1980s. The emphasis in the present work is on world oil production limits and some consequences
of various possible scenarios for the near future. Some of the data and scenarios used by
Hafemeister are updated for U.S. oil production in the past two decades, and extended to an analysis
of a peak in world oil production in the future. We discuss some simple scenarios for future energy
use patterns and look at the consequence of these scenarios as world oil production begins to
decline. We also provide a list of resources for critical investigations of natural resource extraction
and depletion patterns. © 2007 American Association of Physics Teachers.
关DOI: 10.1119/1.2757625兴
I. INTRODUCTION

II. HUBBERT’S PEAK AND OIL PRODUCTION

In several papers published in this journal in the 1970s and
1980s, David Hafemeister presented a series of “Science and
society tests,” including papers on “The energy crisis,”1
“Transportation,”2 “The 94th Congress,”3 “Energy
economics,”4 and “Energy conservation.”5 A key paper in the
same vein was Bartlett’s “Forgotten fundamentals of the energy crisis.”6 More recently there has been an increasing
awareness7 of the possibility that our fossil fuel resources
might not keep pace with increasing world consumption. In
this paper we revisit some of the problems posed by Hafemeister, take a look at how the concepts have stood the test
of time, and update his models where necessary.
One of the main concerns of this paper will involve a shift
in emphasis from United States resource 共principally petroleum products兲 extraction, to world production and consumption patterns. A clear result of the peak in oil production
in the United States in the early 1970s is that imported oil
became a substitute for domestic petroleum products. There
is growing concern that we are approaching a peak in world
oil production within the next 20 years, if not sooner. Furthermore, it appears that natural gas reserves in North
America might not be as extensive as was thought only a few
years ago. Both U.S. and Canadian production of natural gas
appear to have been declining slightly for several years in
spite of increasing prices, drilling activity, and demand. It
thus becomes interesting to look for substitutes once again,
which implies quickly finding replacements for the extremely high energy density fuel on which our industrialized
societies are dependent.
In addition to the “back-of-the-envelope” calculations that
helped to make the papers by Hafemeister so interesting, we
will use some simple spreadsheet-based models in which the
parameters can be easily changed to test various assumptions. Finally, we will point out some useful resources that
can be used to quickly find relevant data. Much of the available information is in non-SI units, but we have made an
attempt to include commonly used units and SI units for
every problem.
It will be useful to include here a set of energy unit conversions for easy reference. In Table I are shown not only
conversions between metric and English units of energy, but
also energy equivalents for different types of fossil fuels,
along with commonly used energy industry units.

We begin our investigation of the production of energy
resources by looking at what appears at first glance to be
simple questions: How much oil is there in the world, and
how long will it last? In 1956 a petroleum geologist named
M. King Hubbert made the startling prediction that the production of oil in the continental United States would probably reach its maximum by the early 1970s. Because oil
production at the time had been increasing steadily for a
century at a rate of several percent per year, Hubbert’s prediction appeared to many petroleum specialists to be unreasonable. Continental U.S. oil production did reach a peak in
1970, a milestone that was fully perceived only a few years
after the fact, because oil production fluctuates for many reasons other than petroleum geology. The name “Hubbert’s
peak” has been given to the phenomenon of peak oil production.
Hubbert wrote many articles over the years in which he
explained some of the methodology he used in arriving at his
predictions for peak oil production in the U.S., and for the
possibility of peak oil production in the world as a whole at
some time in the future.8 Several points should be made at
the outset. There are many different sources of oil 共for example, conventional on-shore drilling, off-shore deep-water
drilling, and tar sands兲 and different authors use more or less
strict definitions of which oil types “count.” We will try to be
explicit about the accounting methods used. In general, once
the oil is in a form in which it can be sent to a refinery, the
provenance is not important, as all oils are equivalent. A
basic point is that all of the fossil fuels are finite, and therefore any production of this resource leads to depletion. Production increases initially from a low level when exploitation
of the resource begins. When the resource is nearing depletion, production is again very low. In between these two
extremes there must be a maximum production level. The
question is when that maximum will occur and how high the
maximum rate of production will be.
In the following set of problems we investigate the range
of likely dates of world peak oil production, as well as the
rate of production under different possible scenarios.
Problem 1. 共a兲 Given available data for U.S. oil production, use a Gaussian function and a logistic model to describe
production as a function of time. 共b兲 Find the estimated ultimately recoverable oil in the U.S. 共c兲 How much difference
did the opening of the Alaskan reserves 共unknown to Hub-
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Table I. Energy units used in this paper, along with the energy content of various fossil fuels.
1 KWh= 3414 BTU; 1 BTU= 1055 J
1 Quad= 1015 BTU= 1.06⫻ 1018 J = 1.06 EJ
1 kilocalorie共kcal兲 = 4.187 kJ= 3.968 BTU
1 ton of oil equivalent 共toe兲 ⯝ 42 GJ⯝ 40 million BTU
1 million barrels of oil equivalent= 5.8 trillion BTU
Crude oil – 139 000 BTU/ gal= 38.8 MJ/ liter
Gasoline – 125 000 Btu/ U.S. gal= 34.9 MJ/ liter
Diesel/heating oil – 139 000 BTU/ U.S. gal= 38.8 MJ/ liter
Ethanol – 84 400 BTU/ U.S.gal= 23.6 MJ/ liter
Natural gas – 1030 BTU/ cf= 37 MJ/ m3
Coal – bituminous, ⯝12 000 BTU/ lb 共28 MJ/ kg兲
Coal – sub-bituminous, ⯝9000 BTU/ lb 共21 MJ/ kg兲

bert in 1956兲 make on U.S. production rates?
Problem 2. Given published estimates of world oil reserves and historical oil production data, calculate the approximate date of peak oil production.
Problem 3. Given world oil production patterns, that is,
rates and cumulative production, what are the best estimates
of ultimately recoverable world oil?
Data. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration maintains a database of energy information, including a record of yearly U.S. oil production from
1859 to the present.9 Each year the company BP releases a
review of world energy. In the 2006 edition10 the estimate of
world oil reserves is 1200.7 billion barrels of oil 共note the
precision兲. The U.S. Geological Survey 共USGS兲 publishes
estimates of cumulative oil production, oil reserves, and of
ultimately recoverable reserves 共URR兲. Their most recent
mean value for the remaining possibly recoverable oil is
2628 billion barrels,11 slightly more than twice that in the BP
report. World oil consumption has grown at a rate of 1.6%
per year over the past decade to about 80⫻ 106 barrels
共80 MMbd兲 per day in 2004.10 From 1885 to 1973 oil production worldwide increased at a constant rate of 7% per
year.8
Answer 1(a). A relatively simple function to apply to the
modeling of oil production is the Gaussian function, be it for
one field, one country, or for the world as a whole.
P = Q⬁Ae−共Y − Y peak兲

2/22

,
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共2兲

where Q⬁ has the same meaning as before, Q is the cumulative production of oil, and dQ / dt is the rate of extraction.
The initial 共exponential兲 rate of growth of reserve production
is described by the parameter b. The logistic equation can be
given a plausible interpretation. The rate of production of a
resource will initially increase exponentially, the ultimate
limit to the resource being at first unimportant. As the cumulative production becomes a significant fraction of the ultimate reserve, extraction becomes more difficult, and the rate
of extraction decreases. Because there is an ultimate limit to
the amount of oil in the ground, the rate of production will
eventually go to zero. The solution to Eq. 共2兲 is given by
Q共t兲 =

Q⬁
Q⬁
=
.
Q⬁ − Q共0兲 −bt 1 + ae−bt
e
1+
Q共0兲

冋

册

共3兲

Note that there are three undetermined parameters that can
in principle be found by comparison with actual data. In
reality, the problem is not so simple, especially because eco-

共1兲

where P is the oil production in a given year, Q⬁ is the URR,
 is the half-width of the production curve, and A is a normalization constant, A = 1 / 冑2. The time scale is given in
years, with Y peak the year of peak oil production. In Fig. 1 we
show production data along with a Gaussian curve that characterizes the Energy Information Administration data for the
history of oil production in the continental U.S. We can use a
spreadsheet to plot the actual production data and corresponding Gaussian fits. Bartlett has analyzed the sensitivity
of the fitting of production in the U.S. to Gaussians with
differing parameters, and has extended this analysis to world
oil production.12
It is possible to consider other fitting functions, and even a
simple linear increase followed by a linear decrease can give
an adequate representation of U.S. oil production.1 In any
case, we see that a simple, continuous mathematical function
adequately describes the trajectory of U.S. oil production.
Hubbert used a more complicated mathematical formulation that also has a more useful physical interpretation. The
917

logistic or Verhulst function is often used to describe growth
in a system subject to a finite capacity or resource. The mathematical form of the logistic equation is given by

Fig. 1. Oil production and Gaussian fit in thousands of barrels per day. Data
are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 共EIA兲; 共Ref. 9兲 the
Gaussian curve has parameters Y peak = 1971, Q⬁ = 190 Gb 共1 Gb= 109 barrels
of oil兲, and  = 22 years. The data shown here represent crude oil production
from the continental U.S. only, and include no natural gas liquids or oil from
nonconventional sources.
Brecha, Berney, and Craver
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Fig. 2. Cumulative U.S. oil production and predictions in billions of barrels.
The two logistic curves are based on predictions by Hubbert 共Ref. 8兲, and
from current trends. The ultimately recoverable reserves are ⬇195 billion
barrels.

nomic and political factors in the 1970s and 1980s led to a
noticeable readjustment to trends in world oil production.
The data for cumulative oil production in the continental
U.S. along with two logistic curves are shown in Fig. 2. The
lower curve corresponds to the parameters found by
Hubbert8 共Q⬁ = 170, b = 0.069, a = 1500兲, and the upper curve
is a fit using additional data for the past 25 years since Hubbert’s paper 共Q⬁ = 195, b = 0.065, a = 1500兲. Hubbert predicted an ultimately recoverable reserve of about 170 Gb
共where Gb⬅ 109 barrels兲 for the continental U.S.; it now
appears that the trend will lead to an amount closer to
195 Gb. However, Hubbert did not consider off-shore deepwater oil or some of the enhanced oil-recovery techniques
that have been applied since. Alaskan North Slope oil is not
included here, because this resource was not part of Hubbert’s initial calculation. One argument used against the concept of “peak oil” is that we will always find another source
of oil or replacement energy when the economic and technological conditions are ripe. However, as we shall see, even
these additional discoveries did not alter the fact that total
U.S. production has never exceeded the 1970 peak.
A second point is that in the early, exponential growth
stages of resource production, it is very difficult to determine
the final trajectory of the production curve based on the logistic 共or any other兲 model. It is only when the limiting factors become important that the two curves shown in Fig. 2
separate.
Answer 1(b). A complementary way of using the logistic
equation is to plot current production as a fraction of cumulative production, taken as a function of the cumulative production itself. The production rate P is given by P = dQ / dt
and
P/Q = b −

b
Q.
Q⬁
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also circled the point at which U.S. oil production actually
peaked.
Answer 1(c). Starting in the late 1970s, oil from Alaska
became an important part of the U.S. production mix. The
Alaskan North Slope represents one of the largest new oil
discoveries of the past several decades, and therefore can be
expected to play a large role in the shape of the U.S. production curve. Using data from the Energy Information Administration, we plot in Fig. 4 both the production from the
continental U.S. and that of Alaska. The key point is that,
although Alaskan oil is a significant fraction of total U.S.
production, it did not provide enough additional oil to
change the date of the overall production peak. Instead, Alaskan oil contributed a secondary peak to overall U.S. production, demonstrating that a single oil province can make a
large difference in the production of a given country. In addition, the shape of production curves for the country as a
whole does not have to follow the simple proposed relations
because production is a sum of curves for individual oil
fields.
Answer 2. The first set of examples using data for U.S. oil
production serves as a background against which to evaluate
the usefulness of the same techniques for predicting the pos-

共4兲

A plot of P / Q vs Q yields a curve that, after some initial
noise, settles down to a fairly linear form. The x-intercept is
the ultimate recoverable reserve, Q⬁. The straight line drawn
on the curve 共as a guide to the eye兲 in Fig. 3 leads to an
ultimately recoverable reserve of about 200 Gb. We have
918

Fig. 3. The Hubbert linearization, a plot of P / Q vs Q 共cumulative continental U.S. oil production兲. From the linear portion of the curve we can extrapolate to find the ultimately recoverable reserves, the point when production drops to zero.

Fig. 4. Plot of combined continental U.S. and Alaska production in thousands of barrels per day. Alaskan production, although significant, has not
been enough to reverse the overall decrease in production since 1970.
Brecha, Berney, and Craver
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Fig. 5. World oil production and predictions in billions of barrels per year.
The data points are actual world oil production. The two Gaussian curves
are based on predictions by BP 共smaller curve, URR of ⬇2 trillion barrels兲
and the United States Geological Survey 共larger area curve, 1998 estimate of
ultimately recoverable reserves equal to ⬇3 trillion barrels兲.

Fig. 6. Hubbert linearization for world oil production. A fit to the linear
portion of the curve can be used to find the ultimately recoverable reserves,
the x-intercept. The result is Q⬁ = 2250± 100 Gb.

sible trajectory of world oil production. We can again use a
spreadsheet to plot the actual production data and Gaussian
curves with appropriate widths, maximum values, and total
area such that agreement is reached 共roughly兲 between the
BP and USGS predictions for total production plus reserves
and past history of oil production. Because it is more difficult
to find a time-series record of world oil production for dates
earlier than the BP data 共before 1965兲, we use a trick to
approximate the production. From approximately 1865 to
1973, oil production increased very nearly exponentially at a
growth rate of 7% per year. In our model we use the exponential function to fit the data.
As shown in Fig. 5, the estimate for perhaps the most
important unknown quantity, the year of maximum world oil
production, does not vary much 共BP: 2005, peak production
30 Gb/ yr; USGS: 2020, peak production 35 Gb/ yr兲. As was
pointed out by Bartlett,12 at current rates of oil use, for every
billion barrels of recoverable oil discovered, the date of peak
oil is moved back by approximately 5.5 days. New discoveries over the course of the past decade or so have been at
the rate of less than 10 Gb/ yr. The BP report does show
slightly increasing reported reserves with time, with most of
this increase coming from the reclassification of potential
resources to actual reserves. The USGS value for remaining
reserves might be considered as an upper limit for conventional oil, given that it relies on 1998 predictions of new oil
discoveries occurring at a rate several times those actually
seen in recent years.
Answer 3. The main problem with the estimates that we
just found for the peak date is that, as long as we are on the
“front side” of the curve, it is extremely difficult to clearly
project the ultimate shape of the production curve given the
fluctuations in oil production due to political and economic
disruptions. It would be useful to have another method that
could help more clearly indicate the ultimately recoverable
reserve. As shown for the U.S., the Hubbert linearization
technique provides a possibility. In Fig. 6 we show a plot of
P / Q vs Q for world oil production, with an inset showing
the region of the curve for which a linear regression was
used to help extrapolate to the URR. The result is Q⬁
= 2250± 100 Gb, which roughly agrees with what would be
inferred from the BP data 共⬇2300 Gb兲, but is significantly

lower than the USGS projection for URR 共⬇3700 Gb兲.
However, this technique does not provide us with more precise output information than gained by fitting the production
curve, because in both cases the starting point is the logistic
equation.
Hafemeister1 used the linear approximation to estimate the
peak in world oil production, given optimistic and pessimistic values for recoverable reserves of 2100 and 1350 Gb,
respectively. The corresponding peak dates he found were
2004 and 1993. These 30-year-old predictions, especially
that of the optimistic case, seem remarkably relevant today.
To close out this section we comment on the intersection
of science and public policy. It is inherently difficult to obtain sound, objective information about oil reserves and resources, a problem compounded by the secrecy with which
these data are surrounded by oil-producing countries. Perhaps the best way to make an assessment of predictions
about peak oil is to follow a given set of predictions for some
time and see how well they match with actual data. It is also
clear that economics will play a role in spurring oil production, a topic we will address later.
In 1999 Duncan and Youngquist13 made 42 country-bycountry predictions for oil peaking dates and maximum production amounts. The 42 countries chosen by the authors
represent 98% of world oil production. The authors arrive at
a predicted peak world production date of 2007, at a production of 30.6 Gb in that year. Their work is interesting in that
we now have several years’ worth of additional data to compare to their predictions. Of those countries, 14 had already
reached peak production prior to 1997, and nine others were
predicted to reach peak production after 2006. Therefore, 19
countries were predicted to experience a maximum in production between 1998 and 2006: 14 countries apparently did
reach a peak in production, and seven of these countries do
so somewhat earlier than predicted. At least six countries
have either been at a production plateau for several years, or
have been politically unstable so that production has varied
wildly.
One topic that we have not yet addressed is that of nonconventional oil. This term can take on a variety of meanings, ranging from deep-water oil in the Gulf of Mexico to
oil from the Arctic and other more exotic sources. If we
consider the two most-discussed resources in this category,
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tar sands and shale oil, there exist, in principle, very large
amounts of oil to be recovered. We will consider the feasibility of large-scale production of these resources in the following. It is not necessarily the reserves or resources that are
most important, but the rate at which these can be produced,
as well as the net energy gain from production. Even optimistic industry estimates predict that these nonconventional
sources will play a small role for the next few decades.
In summary, the best estimates of the ultimately recoverable reserve of world oil lie between 2000 and 3000 Gb,
whereas total consumption to date is approximately
1000 Gb. The date of peak oil production based on these
estimates is likely to be between 2005 and 2020. Oil reserves
are often quoted in the media in terms of the number of years
left, based on current production levels. For example, a remaining reserve of 1500 Gb at a current production of 30 Gb
per year leads to the oft-heard statement that we have 50
years of oil remaining. From the previous examples it should
be clear that a more relevant number is the date of peak
production, after which demand for oil will be, all else being
equal, greater than the amount that can be produced. This
geological peak is not to be confused with the economic
mismatch between global demand for oil and the current
supply capacity, a situation that may arise with or without the
geological peak.
We now turn to one of the critical uses for petroleum, the
transportation sector, which, at least in the U.S., depends
almost entirely on petroleum.
III. DRIVING HABITS, FUEL EFFICIENCY,
AND CONSERVATION
About two-thirds of oil consumption in the U.S. is currently due to the transportation sector.14 It seems reasonable
to assume that potential changes in the transportation sector
will also play a large role in reducing the need for oil in the
future. Even if peak oil production is several years in the
future, there are economic ramifications 共chiefly in the form
of increased oil prices兲 if world oil demand increases more
quickly than supply infrastructure changes can be made.
There are three broad possibilities for reducing transportation fuel demand 共chiefly gasoline, but also diesel fuel兲. We
can change current driving habits to use less fuel, develop
new technologies that use fuel more efficiently, or switch to
alternative fuels. An interesting analysis of the second case is
given by Hirsch.15 We now consider several possible pathways for reducing gasoline demand. A key point in light of
the peak oil scenarios discussed in Sec. II is the time scales
involved. If oil production is nearing a peak, reduction of
fuel use must occur fairly rapidly even without growth in
demand.
Problem 4. If we consider a savings of 1 million barrels
per day of oil, equivalent to 5% of our current consumption,
to be a significant contribution to reducing dependence on
fossil fuels, how many fewer miles per day should an average United States citizen drive if the country as a whole is to
reach this goal?
Problem 5. What would be the savings in gallons per year
consumed by automobiles if highway speeds were 60 mph
instead of 70 mph?
Problem 6. How much fuel could be saved by increasing
car-pooling rates by 100%?
Problem 7. How much fuel could be saved by cutting the
average number of shopping trips in half?
920
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Table II. Light vehicle usage and mileage for the U.S. fleet. Miles/yr and
mileage are averages for the current U.S. fleet.
Vehicle
Car
Light truck

Number

Miles/yr

Mileage

Gas cons.

136⫻ 106
85⫻ 106

12 200
11 400

22.1 mpg
17.6 mpg

7.5⫻ 1010 gal
5.5⫻ 1010 gal

Problem 8. Make a simple model of the gasoline savings
to be gained by continually replacing the current fleet of
automobiles by models with twice the current Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard fleet average efficiency 共that
is, hybrid gasoline-electric automobiles or the equivalent兲.
Assume as a simplifying approximation that all light-truck
owners begin trading in their vehicles for efficient automobiles, and that the automobile industry can increase production of such autos from current rates by 25% per year. How
do these scenarios compare to the gasoline saved by decreasing the miles driven by 2% per year? Do all your calculations
up to the year 2025, the year to which the Energy Information Administration makes its forecasts.
Data. We first present some data from the annual Transportation Energy Data Book14 in Table II. Additional gasoline and diesel fuel consumption comes from buses, heavy
trucks, and other vehicles, none of which is considered here.
For convenience various data will be given to two or three
digits, but the numbers given should not be taken as indicative of the true number of significant figures.
From Ref. 14 we find that the U.S. consumed 20 million
barrels per day 共MMbd兲 of oil in 2004, with 66% or
13.2 MMbd going for transportation. As typically refined in
the U.S., 42 gallon barrels of crude oil yield 19 gallons of
gasoline,16 with the rest divided among products such as diesel fuel, home heating oil, kerosene, and others. In what follows, we will equate 1 million barrels of oil to 19 million
gallons of gasoline, assuming that consumption of the other
products will also be decreased.
An average trip to work is 12.1 miles, with work-related
driving accounting for 27% of total miles driven; about 13%
of 111 million commuters car-pool to work. Shopping trips
account for 21.1% of all trips and 14.5% of all vehicle miles
traveled, with an average trip being 6.7 miles.14
For the model year 1997 cars that were tested, the mileage
increases by about 17% from 26.8 to 31.4 mpg by reducing
the driving speed from 70 to 60 mph. 共Maximum efficiency
is for travel at 50– 55 mph.兲 For 1984 cars, the mileage goes
from 22.5 to 27.6 mpg for the same speed decrease, an improvement of 23%.14
Answer 4. To save 1 MMbd of crude oil imports or production, it would be necessary to burn 19⫻ 106 fewer gallons
of gasoline each day, assuming that uses for the other products of refining a barrel of oil can be reduced commensurately. We can approximate the data for driving to obtain an
estimate. Assume that an average vehicle gets 20 mpg and
drives 12 000 miles per year. Given the yearly driving per
vehicle, the daily distance driven is 33 miles. With this simplification we see that saving 1 MMbd out of 13.2 MMbd
current consumption of transportation is equivalent to driving 共1 MMbpd/ 13.2 MMbpd兲 ⫻ 33 miles per day= 2.5 miles
per day less. For comparison, it has been estimated that onehalf to two-thirds of driving trips in the U.S. are discretionary 共a matter of definition兲, but if 10% of miles driven could
Brecha, Berney, and Craver
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be avoided, the 1 MMbd 共19 million gallons of gasoline/day,
or 7 ⫻ 109 gallons/ yr兲 goal would be met.
Answer 5. Savings due to speed limit reductions are based
on data for automobiles published in Ref. 14. From this
source we can only guess at the percentage of miles traveled
at highway speeds; for our purposes, we use 20% as a reasonable estimate. For 0.2⫻ 2.6⫻ 1012 miles at an average
mileage for cars of about 24 mpg 共between the values for the
1984 and 1997 cars, as stated in the section on mileage and
speed in Ref. 14兲, gasoline usage is 2.2⫻ 1010 gal/ yr. At an
increased mileage of 30 mpg 共between the 1984 and 1997
data兲, we find gasoline consumption of 1.7⫻ 1010 gal/ yr, for
a savings of 5 ⫻ 109 gal/ yr 共14⫻ 106 gallons/ day兲, equivalent to 740 000 bbl/ d 共using the refining yield mentioned
previously兲.
Answer 6. Savings due to increased rates of car-pooling
can be found by using the fact that 9.7⫻ 107 people ride
alone and 1.4⫻ 107 people car-pool,14 accounting for 共0.27兲
⫻共2.6⫻ 1012兲 miles. Doubling the car-pooling number to
28.8 million people, and using the same average trip, 12.1
miles, and an average mileage of 20 mpg means that there
would
be
a
daily
reduction
of
共14.4⫻ 106兲
6
共3.2
⫻共12.1 miles兲 / 共20 mpg兲 = 8.7⫻ 10 gallons/ day
⫻ 109 gallons/ yr兲, which is the refined equivalent of about
460 000 barrels of oil per day.
Answer 7. Because shopping accounts for 14.5% of
vehicle miles traveled, we can use an estimated average
gasoline mileage of 20 mpg to find 共0.145兲
⫻共2.6⫻ 1012 miles/ yr兲 / 共20 mpg兲 = 1.9⫻ 1010 gallons/ yr.
Cutting the number of trips in half would save
⬇1010 gallons/ yr or 2.7⫻ 107 gallons of gasoline each day,
the equivalent of 1.4⫻ 106 barrels of oil each day.
Taken together, these four scenarios represent a total savings of approximately 75 million gallons of gasoline per day
共27 billion gallons each year兲.
Answer 8. We use a simple spreadsheet 共available from the
authors兲 to calculate changes in gasoline consumption based
on the previous assumptions. In recent years, the automobile
and light vehicle fleet in the U.S. has grown by about
1.5%/yr and an average passenger car travels 12 200 mi/ yr
and the average light truck travels about 11 300 mi/ yr. If we
keep these numbers constant, total gasoline use in the country slowly decreases over time due to newer, slightly more
efficient autos replacing older, less efficient models
共“business-as-usual” scenario兲. This scenario is optimistic,
because actual gasoline usage has been rising by 2%/yr for
the past decade, and has continued to rise even in the face of
higher gasoline prices over the past 2 years.14
We plot in Fig. 7 the cumulative amount of gasoline saved
under different assumptions. We include the sum of the savings from the scenarios discussed in Problems 4–7 共labeled
“Habits”兲, taken with respect to the business as usual case. A
change in the number of miles driven per year alone, and
continued over a long period of time 共“Drive 2% Less per
Year”兲, also leads to a significant decrease in total gasoline
usage, approximately 12.5 billion gallons per year.
In contrast, even a massive introduction of hybrid vehicles
at a sustained rate of growth of 25%/yr takes several years to
have a large effect on overall gasoline usage 共“Hybrid Intensive”兲, as illustrated in Fig. 7. Not until near the end of our
time window do yearly gasoline usage reductions from hybrid 共or other high mileage兲 vehicles begin to catch up to the
efficiencies achieved by simply driving less. For this sce921
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Fig. 7. Cumulative gasoline savings over the next 20 years for three scenarios: a hybrid-auto intensive future, a combination of driving-habit
changes, and a reduction in miles driven per year. The scenarios are described in the text; the savings are taken with respect to a business-as-usual
scenario.

nario we have assumed that hybrids initially replace lower
mileage trucks only. As production increases, average cars
are also replaced by hybrids as well, until by about 2020 all
new vehicle production is in the form of hybrids. It is almost
certainly not realistic to think that production of 50 mpg cars
will grow at 25%/yr for 20 years, such that finally all vehicles produced will have mileage at that level.
It is clear that the quickest alternative for short-term gasoline savings is in the form of conservation. The lesson is that
personal behavior changes can have a significant, immediate
effect, whereas technological changes to an infrastructure as
large and long-lived as that of automobiles require a long
lead time. In Ref. 14 we find that the average lifetime of an
automobile is about 15 years, and the average age of cars on
the road is about 9 years. These facts illustrate the time
scales inherent in making technological efficiency changes.
Two further points bear mentioning. Predictions for the
rate of decrease in the oil supply for the case of world peakoil production are in the range of 3 % – 5 % / yr; the 2% decrease in driving each year assumed in our scenario could
therefore only be a part of the action taken to reduce energy
use if peak oil were imminent and of such severity. Second,
a common phenomenon known in economics as Jevons’
paradox17 might mitigate further against the savings found
by the introduction of hybrid technology. As noted by the
19th century English economist William Stanley Jevons, as
technologies are introduced that use a natural resource more
efficiently, we will very likely more than compensate for the
increase in efficiency by finding new uses for the resource. It
is not clear how far this effect will play a role in the case of
possible peak oil production.
In Refs. 1 and 2 Hafemeister considered the possible
savings by increasing mileage standards for automobiles
共13 mpg average in 1974兲 and by changing personal driving
habits. Progress was initially made in automobile mileage
after the introduction of the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standards in 1975. Since 1990 improvements in
mileage have stalled, and because of the increase in lowmileage pickup trucks, minivans, and sport utility vehicles,
overall mileage in the U.S. fleet has been decreasing since
the late 1980s.
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IV. TRANSPORTATION MODES
Total U.S. energy use for transportation in 2004 was 26.9
quadrillion BTU, the energy equivalent of 4.6⫻ 109 barrels
of oil. Of this energy, 61.4% was used by light vehicles,
8.4% was due to air travel 共mostly passenger兲, and only 0.4%
was due to passenger rail transport. We now investigate a
few of the issues surrounding the energy use for different
types of transportation.
Problem 9. Compare the energy necessary for building a
new automobile with the energy used to drive the car for
150 000 miles.
Problem 10. Compare the energy intensity for three modes
of travel: automobile, train, and airplane. Give your answers
in BTU/passenger-mile.
Problem 11. How many months of automobile gasoline
energy does a single person’s share of one round-trip flight to
Europe represent?
Problem 12. Compare the estimated cost in energy and in
time for driving and flying for a 500 mile trip.
Data. The embodied energy in an automobile can be estimated using a life-cycle analysis approach.18 From Ref. 18
the embodied energy in a manufactured automobile is approximately 108 BTU, depending on the car model. Fuel
economy for new cars averages 29 mpg.14 Although this
number seems generous in light of estimates made by other
agencies, which are as much as 15% lower,19 we will use it
in what follows.
In Ref. 14, Tables 9.2 and 9.14, we find energy intensity
for domestic air and rail travel to be 3800 BTU/
passenger-mile and 2800 Btu/ passenger-mile, respectively,
and that the total intercity air travel energy consumption is
2.7⫻ 1015 BTU for 7.1⫻ 1011 passenger-miles in 2000. From
the same source we find that roughly 27% of all vehiclemiles traveled are for work purposes and that vehicle occupancy rates are 1.1 persons/vehicle for work-related trips and
roughly 1.8 persons/vehicle for other trips. Total gasoline
and diesel energy use for light vehicles is 1.6
⫻ 1016 BTU/ yr.
Answer 9. For an average new car with gasoline mileage
of 29 mpg,14 the lifetime consumption will be approximately
150 000 miles
⫻ 125 000 BTU/gal = 650 ⫻ 106 BTU.
29 miles/gallon
共5兲
Compared to the energy embodied in manufacturing the car,
⬇100⫻ 106 BTU, the energy consumed during its lifetime
use is clearly dominant. It is interesting to consider the consequences of building automobiles such as hybrid electric
vehicles that may be twice as efficient, but use larger quantities of energy-intensive materials such as copper and aluminum. At some point the embodied energy becomes a significant fraction of the total lifetime energy consumption.
Hafemeister2 considered some of these issues in more detail.
The same can be argued for energy-efficient buildings: for
buildings that use very little energy for heating or electricity,
the embodied energy in the building materials becomes an
increasingly important consideration.
Answer 10. For air and rail travel we have a direct comparison that can be made from the data. For automobiles we
can take the total energy, the total number of miles driven,
and the average occupancy to find
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1.6 ⫻ 1016 BTU
共1.5 passengers/vehicle兲共2.8 ⫻ 1012vehicle-miles兲
=

3800 BTU
,
passenger-mile

共6兲

where we have used an estimated overall average of 1.5
passengers/vehicle.
Answer 11. A round-trip flight to Europe from the Midwest
is approximately 10 000 miles. At an energy intensity of
3800 BTU/ passenger-mile, such a trip represents an energy
use of approximately 3.8⫻ 107 BTU, or 3.8⫻ 107 BTU/
125 000 BTU/ gal= 300 gal of gasoline. 共The volumetric energy content of jet fuel is roughly the same as gasoline.兲 We
compare this use to yearly travel of 12 000 miles at 20 mpg,
or 600 gal of gasoline. We see that a single round-trip flight
“costs” about 6 months worth of gasoline. For a family of
four, we estimate that the 1200 gallons used flying is the
equivalent of about 2 years’ worth of driving.
Answer 12. For a 500 mile trip, an average light vehicle
will use 500 miles/ 20 mpg= 25 gallons of gasoline, or 3
⫻ 106 BTU 共for as many people as we wish to put in the car兲.
A flight of the same distance uses 共500 miles兲
⫻ 共3800 BTU/ passenger-mile兲 for each passenger, or 1.9
⫻ 106 BTU 共for each passenger兲. The former might be seen
to overstate the case, because the average mileage of newer
cars is closer to 29 mpg, whereas the latter underestimates
the fuel used because proportionately more fuel is used in
starting and landing on a short flight than on a long flight. On
the other hand, airplanes also carry nonbaggage cargo, thus
affecting the passenger energy efficiency.
We can estimate the time spent traveling by assuming a
door-to-door trip at mostly highway speeds to take
500 miles/ 60 mph= 8.3 h, which we round to 9 h to account
for slower periods of travel. For the flight, we estimate 0.5 h
for the trip to a nearby airport, 1.5 h waiting time 共recommended arrival time before the flight兲, 1.5 h flight, and 1 h to
disembark, claim luggage, and travel to the final destination,
for a total of 4.5 h. Roughly speaking, the short flight uses
twice the energy of driving and takes half the time.
These numbers should be used with caution, due to their
great uncertainties. A history of U.S. transportation energy
efficiency20 attempts to sort out some of these issues. To a
first approximation, it is found that energy intensities for all
modes of transportation are equal, at about 3500 BTU/
passenger-mile, with certainties of ⬇ ± 500 BTU/
passenger-mile 共estimated from various calculations兲.
In Ref. 1, Hafemeister looked at similar scenarios to those
presented in this section and refers to the possibility of a
50% savings in transportation fuel consumption achievable
by habit changes. At the time 共using numbers from 1970兲
transportation energy use was 1.65⫻ 1016 BTU; as noted,
current consumption is 2.64⫻ 1016 BTU. The population of
the United States has grown over the same time interval from
approximately 200 million to 300 million; therefore, per
capita annual transportation energy has increased from 8.3
⫻ 107 to 8.8⫻ 107 BTU/ person.
V. ALTERNATIVE FUELS
There have been many suggested fossil-fuel substitutes for
conventional petroleum and natural gas. Examples are shale
oil, tar sands, and gas hydrates, all of which are believed to
exist in resources totaling many times the amounts currently
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published for conventional oil and gas resources. Numbers
commonly accepted for these resources are 3600 billion barrels of oil in Canadian tar sands and Venezuelan heavy oil,
1800 billion barrels of oil shale in the U.S., and approximately an equal amount elsewhere in the world,21 and 600–
6000 billion barrels of oil equivalent 共1014 – 1015 m3兲 in
methane hydrates in the ocean.22 These numbers are to be
compared to the approximately 1200 billion barrels of oil,
along with 179 trillion cubic meters of natural gas 共1100
billion barrels of oil equivalent兲, thought to be proven and
recoverable under projected economic conditions.10
These numbers might seem to make the whole discussion
of this paper moot, except for three cautions. First, the actual
recoverable amounts of these nonconventional resources will
vary greatly depending on economic factors. In general, the
economically recoverable reserves are a small fraction of the
estimated totals in place. Second, the crucial variable for
thinking about peak oil production is, in the end, the rate of
production and not the total reserve amount. For example,
even in an optimistic scenario the production of oil from
Canadian tar sands is expected to increase by at most
⬇1 MMbd every 5 years, reaching an output of 5 MMbd in
2030 共Ref. 23兲 共if Canadian natural gas production, now in
decline, can meet the demand兲. Finally, although it is clear
that an energy input is necessary to extract fossil fuel resources, this input energy has usually been neglected because
the ratio of output to input energies has been relatively high.
For conventional oil and gas resources the ratio of output to
input energies is high enough that the latter is of little importance. For nonconventional tar sands oil, the energy return on
energy invested 共EROEI兲 might be as little as 2:1 共perhaps as
high as 5:1; it is difficult to find well-documented numbers兲,
compared to 20:1 for conventional oil and natural gas.24
Thus, the net energy available to perform other useful work
is significantly less than it is for a high-EROEI resource.
According to Ref. 24 the EROEI of oil and gas extraction
has declined from a value of 100:1 in 1930. The ratio is not
constant, and is an indicator that extraction of fossil fuels is
becoming more difficult.
A second category of fossil-fuel substitutes are those derived from biomass. Currently the most commonly discussed
source of biofuel in the U.S. is ethanol derived from corn. In
Brazil there has been much success making ethanol from
sugar cane, and in Germany various forms of biodiesel are
fairly common. Again, several questions arise when considering these sources of liquid fuel energy. First, the EROEI
question is acute, although controversial,25–27 and even in a
best-case scenario, corn-to-ethanol provides an energy return
ratio of about 1.3:1. Second, if the whole energy conversion
process is considered, ethanol production plus combustion
result in only about a 15% decrease in overall carbon dioxide
emissions.27 Third, there is a serious ethical question to consider if we convert what is essentially a food and animal feed
crop into fuel for vehicles.
Another possible source of substitutes for fossil fuels is
found in renewable resources such as wind and solar energy,
the former for electricity generation, the latter for both electricity and thermal energy. At present, these sources make up
⬇0.18% and 0.06%, respectively, of U.S. energy
consumption.28 Currently, the largest contribution to the use
of renewable energy in the U.S. is due to hydroelectric power
generation; however, this option leaves little room for future
large-scale expansion.
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In the following problems we investigate various energy
scenarios. It is not our intention to make prognostications
about which scenarios might be most likely, but taken together, they give a sense of the options available in the event
of a future decrease in the availability of oil and/or natural
gas. The energy scenarios are implemented using a spreadsheet and make assumptions for each energy pathway that
are roughly consistent with what can be found in the open
literature and from projections of companies in the energy
industry.
Problem 13. If the United States were to replace all transportation fuel with ethanol distilled from corn, how much
land would be required? How does this result compare to the
total amount of agricultural land in the U.S.? 共Nobody would
suggest that such an extreme substitution could take place.兲
Problem 14. Considering the EROEI of ethanol production
from corn, and assuming that 25% of future gasoline demand
could be met by ethanol, what is the energy equivalent in
barrels of oil production per day that will be required for
transportation by 2025?
Problem 15. If the U.S. were to move heavily into wind
energy and photovoltaics, what annual growth rate would be
necessary for these sources to deliver 50% of electrical demand in the country by 2050? For the world? Assume equal
shares for wind and solar electricity in 2050.
Problem 16. Given current estimates for the future contribution of nonconventional oil sources and for conventional
oil and natural gas shortfalls, model the future energy supply
for the U.S. under different plausible scenarios.
Data. Total planted cropland in the U.S. is about 320 million acres. Corn production represents about 25% of this
cropland, with an average yield of 140 bushels/acre.29 This
yield is increasing over time at about 2%/yr. Conversion to
ethanol yields 2.6 gal/ bushel of corn. The energy density of
ethanol is approximately 63% that of gasoline,
80 000 BTU/ gal compared to 125 000 BTU/ gal. Energy
use for light vehicle transportation is 16.2⫻ 1015 BTU
共16 quads兲, and is growing at 2%/yr.14
Total electricity consumption for the U.S. 共currently 4.2
⫻ 1012 kWh or 4200 TWh兲 has grown at about 2%/yr over
the last 10 years and world net electricity consumption
共currently 18 200 TWh兲 has grown at 3%/yr.10,30 From 1998
to 2004, the use of wind in the U.S. as an energy source
grew at a rate of 25%/yr from 0.031 to
0.14 quads 共4.1⫻ 1010 kWh兲, while solar photovoltaic capacity has grown by ⯝18%/yr.28,31 Currently 共as of 2004兲,
approximately 0.2⫻ 1010 kWh of electricity was generated
from photovoltaics.31,32 Worldwide, solar electric growth has
been at a rate of 6.5%/yr 共2002 electricity generation was
1 TWh兲 and wind energy has grown at 23%/yr 共2002 electricity generation was 11 TWh兲.33
Answer 13. Because light vehicle transportation energy
use is currently 16.2 quads per year, to replace this use fully
with ethanol from corn as currently produced would require
16.2⫻ 1015 BTU= 8 ⫻ 104Btu/ gal⫻ 2.6gal/ bushel
⫻ 140 bushels / acre ⫻ 共number of acres兲. The total of 556
million acres of land is significantly more than the total
planted cropland in the U.S. Several caveats are in order.
Automobile engines can be tuned to higher compression ratios for use with ethanol, thus negating part of the energy
density disadvantage. Second, we would hope that a largescale retooling of the transportation sector would also include a significant increase in mileage for automobiles. In
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any case, it is impractical to rely on this alternative source of
energy for anything more than a small fraction of total transportation energy needs.
Answer 14. An EROEI of 1.5 implies a net energy “profit”
of 0.5 units of energy for every unit of energy input. If transportation energy use is increasing by 2%/yr, consumption
will be 24.2 quads by 2025. For ethanol to make up 25% of
this energy we would need 6 quads of net energy; another
4 quads of energy is needed for the production of this ethanol, the energy equivalent of 2.1 MMbd of oil production.
Note that we have not accounted for 75% of an increasing
amount of transportation fuel, or 18 quads, the equivalent of
9.4 MMbd, an amount more than we currently use for light
vehicle transportation. In the face of a peak in world oil
production, it appears unlikely that continued large increases
in ethanol production is a likely scenario.
From Answer 13 the required amount of corn-based ethanol requires 200 million acres of planted corn. Although corn
yields are increasing at 2%/yr, it is inconceivable that this
amount could be produced, even if all other uses of corn are
eliminated. The net result is that ethanol produced from corn
will only be a marginal part of the future energy picture.
Once again, if the problem we face is one of insufficient
liquid fuels, changing personal habits is the most energetically favorable solution.
Answer 15. If the current 2% annual increase continues in
the U.S., electricity demand in 2050 will be 共3.7⫻ 1012兲
⫻ exp共0.02⫻ 45兲 kWh= 9.1⫻ 1012 kWh. We aim for solar
and wind energy to generate 2.3⫻ 1012 kWh each. From the
current production levels of 1.8⫻ 1010 and 3.2⫻ 1010 kWh
we can calculate the annual rate of increase needed to
achieve our goals. For photovoltaics we find the rate of increase to be 11%/yr, while for wind-generated electricity the
increase is 9.5%/yr. These are both apparently within the
realm of possible rates of increase.
For world electricity generation we similarly calculate the
demand in 2050 to be 59 400 TWh, necessitating
15 000 TWh each of solar electric and wind energy. If we
start from the 2002 numbers, the required rates of increase
are found to be 21%/yr for solar and 16%/yr for wind. Both
of these rates of increase are currently being achieved; the
larger question is the sustainability of these rates of growth.
We note that the International Energy Agency 共IEA兲 predictions for renewable energy growth are somewhat less than
those that we just calculated,33 and the projections are for the
shorter time period 2002–2030. Over this time the IEA predicts growth rates of 11% for wind and 16% for solar electric
generation. They also include other important categories for
electricity generation that we have not considered here, such
as biomass and waste, geothermal, and tidal or wave energy.
These additional sources for adding to the renewable electricity generation portfolio allow somewhat greater optimism
for substitution scenarios, as well as giving regionalized optimization possibilities.
Finally, we note that for the case of renewable energy
electricity generation, each kWh of energy displaces approximately three times as much fossil fuel energy, because power
plant efficiency is no longer an issue. This simple argument
ignores the initial energy input needed to manufacture wind
turbines and solar panels, as well as the increased efficiency
available when waste heat from conventional power plants is
utilized. A topic that we do not address here is that of enduse energy in contrast to primary energy consumption; when
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comparing fossil fuel energy use and electrical energy use,
we must be careful to keep track of this distinction.
Closely related to the idea of EROEI for fossil fuels is the
concept of life-cycle assessment when considering renewable
energy technologies.34 Manufacturing photovoltaic panels or
wind turbines takes energy. Life-cycle assessment attempts
to perform a cradle-to-grave analysis of the energy inputs
共and greenhouse-gas emissions兲 for a given process. Although the results vary somewhat, a rough estimate is that
the input energy for wind turbine electricity generation represents about 3% of the lifetime energy generated, equivalent
to an EROEI of ⬇30. For solar photovoltaics, the energy
input is on the order of 8%–10% of the lifetime energy
generation,35 which is equivalent to an EROEI of ⬇9 : 1.
Answer 16. We discuss four scenarios for future energy
production in the U.S. and briefly state the rationale for each
scenario. After presenting an overview of the results of each,
a summary will be given of the total energy production as a
function of time for each scenario. It is clear that none of
these scenarios will correctly describe the future course of
energy use, but as a group they can help provide a sense of
the magnitude of the problem to be faced if petroleum production reaches a worldwide peak by the end of the decade.
In all of the scenarios we assume that both oil and natural gas
reach a peak in consumption in 5 years. Although worldwide
production of natural gas is estimated to peak approximately
20 years after oil, the situation in the U.S. is more critical.
Both the number of wells drilled and the success rate of
wells drilled in the past 5 years have increased; at the same
time, U.S. proven reserves and production have both been
flat or decreasing for most of the past 25 years. For all four
scenarios we assume a decline rate of natural gas and oil
availability of 4%/yr beginning in 2010, after growth rates of
0%/yr and 1%/yr, respectively. Hydroelectric power and geothermal energy are taken as constant, and except where
noted, biomass as an energy source increases at 1%/yr.
The first scenario is a slight modification of current energy
use practices. Solar energy does not increase and wind energy is predicted to grow at 10%/yr, roughly consistent with
rates in the recent past, while nuclear power production and
use of coal both increase at 1%/yr, again consistent with the
recent past. The prognoses for an increase in production of
shale oil and methane hydrates are based on industry, government, and private think-tank studies.36 Shale oil production is assumed to begin commercially in 10 years and to
have a yearly rate of production increase of 0.1 MMbd/ yr,
consistent with the prediction that, “Under high growth assumptions, an oil shale production level of 1 MMbd is probably more than 20 years in the future, and 3 MMbd is probably more than 30 years into the future.”36 From Fig. 8 we
see that this scenario predicts a continued dominance of fossil fuels in the energy mix of the next three decades. Even at
growth rates of 10%/yr for renewables such as solar and
wind energy, the vanishingly small initial levels do not allow
these technologies to make a significant contribution.
The second scenario, shown in Fig. 9, can be thought of as
a “green” alternative to the business-as-usual model. There
are three primary assumptions that go into this model: Solar
and wind energy increase from current levels at a rate of
25%/yr for 30 years; nonconventional sources of petroleum
products are assumed not to play a role, and decline rates of
natural gas and oil production are 4%/yr as before. The asBrecha, Berney, and Craver
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Fig. 8. The moderately changed business-as-usual energy future scenario.
Solar energy is too small to see on the plot and wind energy grows at
10%/yr, while nuclear power and coal as energy sources grow at 1%/yr as is
currently the case.

sumed growth in solar and wind energy implies nearly 100%
renewable energy use by the end of the time period. Biomass
use grows at 2%/yr.
With the larger growth rate for renewable energy sources,
these begin to make a significant contribution to the total
energy mix by the final decade of the projection time. There
are clearly limits to this analysis, as symbolized by the exponential runaway in contributions from wind and solar energy during the final few years of the simulation time. Although we could be skeptical of the assumed growth rate of
25%, Germany has had a 33%/yr average rate of growth in
production for wind energy, 40%/yr photovoltaic electricity,
and 19%/yr for solar thermal energy production, all maintained for the past 10–15 years. Total primary energy consumption in Germany over the same time period remained
constant, to within about 1%, so that the contribution to total
energy use of these renewable sources is approximately 5%
共compared to 0.2% in the U.S.兲.37
Our third scenario might be termed a nuclear-dominated
future. The estimates for nonconventional petroleum prod-

Fig. 9. The green energy future scenario. Solar and wind energy grow at
25%/yr, while nuclear power and coal as energy sources grow at 1%/yr as is
currently the case. Finally, nonconventional oil and gas development are not
pursued and therefore too small to be visible in the plot.
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Fig. 10. The nuclear-supplemented fossil-fuel energy future scenario. Wind
energy grows at 10%/yr and coal grows at 1%/yr, while nuclear power as an
energy source increases at 10%/yr beginning in 10 years to allow for rampup. Solar is too small to be visible.

ucts 共shale oil and hydrates兲 are as in the first scenario, while
wind energy grows at 10%/yr, again as in the first scenario.
Nuclear power, after an initial delay of 10 years, begins to
increase at 10%/yr. The delay might be justified by looking
at the time it takes to have a nuclear power plant proposed,
approved, and built 共assuming that the latter happens at all兲.
Because nuclear power already accounts for 20% of our electricity production, the growth rate of 10%/yr allows nuclear
power to become the dominant energy source by 2035 in this
scenario, as shown in Fig. 10. Nuclear power plants compete
very favorably with other renewable energy sources with respect to life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions,38 but nuclear
fission relies on a nonrenewable resource. The possibilities
presented by breeder reactors and/or nuclear fusion are not
considered here.
The final scenario we consider is a coal-dominated energy
future. Assume for the sake of argument that nonconventional petroleum is impracticable at higher rates of increase,
that nuclear is unacceptable, and that renewables do not increase any faster than the base case outlined in the first scenario, coal is plentiful enough and easy enough to use as a
substitute for declining conventional oil and natural gas.
These assumptions lead to the prediction shown in Fig. 11.
At a growth rate of 5%/yr, coal-based energy relatively
quickly comes to dominate the energy mix in the U.S.; air
pollution and mitigation of CO2 emissions become major
issues under this scenario.
In our initial discussions of all four scenarios we concentrated on the relative contribution of each energy source toward the end of the 30-year time frame. A critically important result to consider from these models is that of the total
energy supply due to all sources. Figure 12 shows the total
energy supply as a function of time for the various scenarios,
along with a projection of energy use based on the 1%/yr
growth in consumption experienced in the past two decades.
The key lesson seen here is the importance of fossil fuels to
our total energy consumption, and that replacement of fossil
fuels, or even a switch to a different mix of fuels, is a timeconsuming and potentially costly process. When the peak in
oil production does occur and U.S. supplies of natural gas
become as difficult to replace as posited in these scenarios,
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intensity will be even greater. A 50% reduction in energy use
共with constant population兲 would put U.S. per capita consumption in line with that of most other industrialized countries.
VI. EQUITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ISSUES

Fig. 11. The coal-enhanced fossil-fuel energy future. Coal consumption increases at a rate of 5%/yr. Wind energy grows at 10%/yr, while nuclear
power grows at 1%/yr as is currently the case. Solar energy is too little to be
visible.

only in the green and coal scenarios 共very optimistic, given
recent past history and worries about environmental damage,
respectively兲 does total energy supply by the year 2035 equal
that which is projected based on the energy consumption
increases of the recent past.
The results shown in Fig. 12, more than any other single
piece of information, encapsulate the arguments of the “peak
oil” community. There is no danger of oil suddenly “running
out.” After the peak, production will begin a long irreversible
decline, and it will be difficult to find substitutes on short
times scales that will allow the U.S. to use as much total
energy as we do currently, let alone continuing to increase
energy use. For the green, nuclear, and coal scenarios, we
might predict a society in 2035 that uses about as much
energy as we currently project will be necessary based on
continuous 1%/yr growth. However, there will be a significant time interval, except in the coal-intense future, during
which energy use will be constrained. 共The assumptions
made in generating these results are only rough guidelines.兲
Another scenario has been added to this summary, labeled
“conserve” in Fig. 12. For this curve it was assumed that
total energy use in the U.S. decreases by 3% per year for the
next 30 years. Thus, energy use will be cut in half by about
2028; given projections for continued population growth in
the U.S. during that time interval, the decrease in energy

Fig. 12. Summary of energy future scenarios.
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It is widely quoted that the U.S. is responsible for approximately 25% of the world’s annual energy consumption, although we have only 5% of the world’s population. Furthermore, per capita energy use in the U.S. is much higher than
in most other industrialized countries. We can make an argument to justify disproportionate energy use by noticing that
the U.S. also accounts for an outsized share of world economic activity, as measured by gross domestic product
共GDP兲, and therefore that the energy intensity of the U.S.
economy is not out of line with that of other industrialized
countries. At least two general questions come to mind based
on these facts. Does the GDP represent a meaningful measure for useful economic activity, or are there other measures
we might use to gain an impression of the elusive “standard
of living”? And, for whatever measure we do use, what are
the implications for world energy use if we profess at least in
principle to hope for an improved standard of living for all of
humanity?
One measure of human development is given by the human development index. To quote from the United Nations
Human Development Report,39 “The human development index 共HDI兲 is a composite index that measures the average
achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by
life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult
literacy rate and the combined gross enrollment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard
of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing
power parity 共PPP兲 U.S. dollars.” Any attempt to measure a
quantity as complex as human development or human wellbeing is subject to much criticism and should be treated with
caution. We will keep this caution in mind as we look at
varying levels of energy use across a range of countries with
differing human development indices.
Problem 17. Compare the total and per capita energy and
oil use of China, Japan, Germany, Kuwait, Mali, Morocco,
Nigeria, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Canada, Venezuela, and the
U.S. Compare the energy intensity of the economies of the
same countries.
Problem 18. Assume that China continues its current development path, with economic growth of ⬇8%/yr, and that
China reaches European levels of GDP and per capita energy
use by 2025. What are the implications for world oil demand
if 共a兲 25% of Chinese energy comes from oil, as is currently
the case, and 共b兲 if the Chinese wish to rely more heavily on
oil in the future 共to avoid burning coal, for example兲, such
that 40% of their energy comes from oil, as is roughly the
case in the U.S. presently? Make the unlikely additional assumption that all other countries maintain their current energy use.
Problem 19. Assume that European per capita energy usage 共roughly half that of the U.S.兲 is sufficient to allow a
reasonable economic development and standard of living.
How much energy would be necessary for the entire world to
achieve this standard of living? If this human development
goal could be reached in 30 years and the energy mix remains constant, what would be the demand for oil in 2035?
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Table III. Total and per capita energy use for nine selected countries. The Human Development Index 共HDI兲 is
a rough measure of standard of living. In general, higher HDI correlates with higher per capita energy use.

Country
Canada
China
Germany
Japan
Kuwait
Mali
Morocco
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
United States
Venezuela

Population
共millions兲

Total energy use
共quadrillion BTU兲

Per capita energy use
共million BTU/yr兲

Total oil consumption
共thousand bbl/d兲

HDI

31.6
1300
82.6
127.7
2.5
12.7
30.6
5.3
125.9
151.8
292.6
25.8

13.5
45.4
14.3
22.4
0.93
0.015
0.50
0.062
0.99
1.9
99.5
2.9

427.9
34.9
172.7
175.6
372.3
1.2
16.2
11.7
7.9
12.4
339.9
113.4

2131
5791
2664
5455
238
4.3
158
26
310
338
20,033
536

0.949
0.755
0.93
0.943
0.844
0.333
0.631
0.69
0.453
0.527
0.944
0.772

Allow the per capita use of energy in the U.S. to decrease to
half its current level, placing us on par with other industrialized countries.
Data. World energy use by fuel: oil 37%, natural gas 24%,
coal 27%, nuclear 6%, hydroelectric 6%, out of a total annual energy use of approximately 413 Quads, with U.S. consumption being roughly 23% of this total.10 These numbers
do not include biomass 共chiefly wood兲 as an energy source;
doing so would increase the total energy used by about 10%,
and lower the other percentages accordingly. The U.S. population is 300 000 000 and expected to continue growing at
approximately 1%/yr, the same rate at which world population is expected to grow in the next 30 years from its current
level of 6.3 billion.
Data for country-by-country energy use are available from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration,30 and demographic data are available from the International Monetary
Fund.40
Answer 17. We first look at total energy use and energy
use per capita for the nine countries of interest 共see Table
III兲. By simply looking at these 共selective兲 data, it would be
difficult to generalize about the amount of energy necessary
for a country to be considered developed or not. In contrast,

a look at the complete set of International Monetary Fund
data40 indicates that all countries with high HDI rankings
also use relatively large amounts of energy 共⬎100
⫻ 106 BTU/ person/ yr, ⬇110 GJ/ person/ yr兲, and all countries with a HDI of less than 0.5 use relatively small amounts
of energy per capita 共⬍60⫻ 106 BTU/ person/ yr, or
66 GJ/ person/ yr兲.
What is more clear is that a country may have a per capita
energy use significantly lower than that of the U.S. or
Canada, and yet maintain a high standard of living. We will
use this information as a rough benchmark for the following
calculations.
To determine the energy intensity of the economy, in units
of BTU/US$GDP, we can again turn to data from either the
International Monetary Fund40 or the Energy Information
Administration.30 There are two possible methods to arrive at
a number, one based on the GDP in units of U.S. dollars,
converting the currency of each country to dollars based on
world market exchange rates, the other by rescaling of the
GDP in US$ based on the purchasing power of the dollar
amount in the country in question 共purchasing power parity兲.
The two values are shown in Table IV. It is now standard for

Table IV. Economic energy intensity determined by two different measures for nine selected countries. Gross
Domestic Product 共GDP兲 can be measured using either market exchange rates 共MER兲 or purchasing power
parity 共PPP兲.

Country
Canada
China
Germany
Japan
Kuwait
Mali
Morocco
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
United States
Venezuela
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GDP/person
共US$, MER兲

GDP/person
共US$, PPP兲

Energy intensity
共BTU/US$ MER兲

Energy intensity
共BTU/US$ PPP兲

27,531
1098
29,646
33,705
17,421
371
1452
745
428
555
37,708
3318

31,548
5087
27,747
27,998
18,047
994
4004
3262
1050
2097
37,353
4953

17 863
33 175
7 545
4 605
23 023
4 735
12 877
15 705
18 457
22 342
9 521
29 326

13 563
6 861
6 224
6 272
23 449
1 226
4 046
3 587
7 524
5 913
9 100
22 895
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Table V. The continued economic growth in China, to the extent that it is tied to the increased use of fossil-fuel
energy, has major implications for world demand of finite resources.

Country
China 共2005兲
China 共2025兲
U.S. 共2005兲

Per cap. energy use
共million BTU/yr兲

Total energy use
共Quad/yr兲

Per cap. GDP
共US$ PPP兲

Oil use 共25%兲
共Gbbl/yr兲

Oil use 共40%兲
共Gbbl/yr兲

35
163
340

45
258
99

$5 100
$23 700
$37 000

2.1
11
na

na
22
7.3

international organizations to use the purchasing power parity numbers when making comparisons involving cost of living and standard of living, and market exchange rates when
looking at exports and imports of traded goods.
We make two observations from these data. Just as measures of well-being based on quantities such as GDP must be
examined critically, the same holds for the energy intensity
numbers as well, because the latter are scaled by the former.
Second, we see that there is a fair agreement in values of the
energy intensity for many developed countries, when based
in terms of purchasing power parity. The U.S. appears 共based
on this measure兲 to be somewhat less efficient than Germany,
Japan, and even China according to these data. The latter is
surprising, and should give some pause for reflection.
Answer 18. To determine the economic implications of
continued growth in Chinese energy consumption, we extrapolate population growth by 1% per year and GDP growth
by 8%/yr, keeping the energy intensity at the current level.
The results of our projection are shown in Table V.
From these assumptions we see that continued GDP
growth at current rates would lead to per capita GDP slightly
less than that of most developed countries today. 共For more
accurate purposes of comparison, the growth rates and the
GDP values should be considered in real terms, that is, adjusting for inflation.兲 In 2025, per capita energy use in China
in this scenario will be roughly half that currently in the
U.S., and similar to current per capita energy use in Europe
and Japan. Due to the large population of China, total energy
use will be 250% of current U.S. total energy use. To accommodate this change in world energy use, total world energy
production would have to increase by 50% in the next 20
years, assuming no increase in annual energy consumption
anywhere else in the world.
The implications for world oil demand are particularly
startling. If China continues supplying ⬇25% of energy
needs through petroleum, the country’s demand will be
150% of current U.S. oil demand by 2025. For China to
supply a percentage of energy needs with oil similar to that
of the U.S., its demand would be roughly three times that of
current U.S. demand. For the former case, growth in Chinese
demand from 2.1 to 11 Gb/ yr, that is, by ⬇9 Gb/ yr, represents 70% of the projected increase in world oil production
according to 共optimistic兲 scenarios developed by the Energy
Information Administration.30 In the Energy Information Administration scenario, world oil production in 2025 will be
⬇120 MMbd 共43 Gb/ yr兲; we saw in Sec. I that a Gaussian
fit to the USGS projections gives a peak production rate of
somewhat less than 40 Gb/ yr. We also mentioned that there
is reason to think that those estimates might be too high. If
China moves away from coal and toward oil as an energy
source, that is, toward the path that other industrialized
economies have chosen over the past century, the increased
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demand by 2025 would be about 20 Gb/ yr, far more than the
Energy Information Administration projects for world increased production by that time.
There are several points that must be made about these
scenarios. We could just as easily have chosen another country, or group of countries, to make clear the ideas we wish to
stress. For example, India is rapidly increasing its energy use
as well, and has a population of around 1 billion. Because
roughly 80% of the world’s population lives outside the
wealthy developed countries and are for the most part consuming relatively small amounts of energy, we are faced with
the dilemma of having to find massive sources of energy in
the near future, or else deny developing countries a standard
of living anywhere near ours. In an economic paradigm unbounded by natural resource limits, there could always be the
hope, however elusive it has thus far been, that the economic
development experienced by the U.S. and others is attainable
by all countries. It would seem that this model might very
well be wrong if the energy sources that drove economic
development, industrialization, and modernization will be in
short共er兲 supply in the future. In any case, population pressures will continue to stretch the ability of the world’s natural resources to afford a reasonable standard of living for
most people.
Answer 19. We can make a quick estimate of the consequences for world energy use. If we look at just the end
points, 2005 and 2035, we find that U.S. total energy use
decreases from the current 94 to 63 Quads in 2035. For the
projected population increase to 390 million in the U.S.,
yearly energy use would be 162 million BTU per person. At
the same per capita energy use and a projected world population of 8.8 billion based on a yearly growth rate of 1%,
total yearly world energy demand would be 1360 Quads,
230% of current demand.
For the simple 共and unlikely兲 assumption that the energy
mix remains constant, oil would have to supply approximately 500 Quads, or 91 billion barrels per year. These numbers are not possible from any combination of conventional
and unconventional sources.
VII. CONCLUSION
One crucial question that remains to be definitively answered is that of the true size of the remaining fossil-fuel
resource, and perhaps as importantly, the likely rate of extraction of this resource. We have not addressed the issue of
climate change and the potentially disastrous consequences
of uncontrolled burning of all remaining fossil fuels,41 especially if the optimists who count on a large fossil-fuel resource base turn out to be correct. The models 共curve-fitting兲
presented in Sec. I are indeterminate because we may be near
an inflection point or a maximum in the various curves.
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If we assume a need to make adjustments to our fossil-fuel
consumption patterns, there are several important points to
be made. First, there are no readily available substitutes for
gasoline 共or diesel fuel兲 in the transportation sector, where
we use the majority of petroleum. Candidate liquid fuels
have either lower energy densities or less favorable net energy characteristics than gasoline and therefore, at the very
least, become relatively expensive options. In addition, any
large-scale shift in consumption patterns implies a long time
scale to make the changes. Because peak oil is near at hand,
almost certainly within a decade, there are bound to be significant economic disruptions during the coming transition
period.
There is no available silver bullet that would allow an easy
transition away from fossil-fuel consumption, with the possible exception of serious reductions in energy use. Renewable energy sources play such a small role in the current
overall energy mix that even crash programs would need
decade-long efforts to make a large impact on reducing
fossil-fuel dependence. Responses to a possible peak in
world oil production 共followed by a peak in natural gas production兲 that involve turning toward ever lower net energy
fossil-fuel sources will have the further disadvantage that
increasing amounts of carbon dioxide will be emitted, thus
exacerbating global climate change.
In the developed world, there is room for improvement in
energy efficiency. In the developing world, reaching standards of living comparable to those of industrialized countries may be elusive without abundant cheap energy. Some
simple estimates indicate that increasing world per capita
energy consumption to even half of that in the U.S. is not
realistically achievable using fossil fuels, and possibly not
with any sources of energy, at least not on a time scale of
several decades.
Even before Hafemeister began his series of papers, an
initial wake-up call to the world had been issued in the
much-maligned work by the Club of Rome,42 which has
since been updated twice. Without going into the details of
why this work should still be read, the main points are borne
out by the calculations presented in this paper: fossil-fuel
resources are finite, exponential growth cannot be sustained
in a finite ecosystem, and population increases are placing
severe pressures on both the ecosystem and on natural resource supplies.
The issues of energy resources, energy conversion, and
alternatives to ever-increasing consumption of fossil fuels
are at least as relevant today as they were when Hafemeister
originally published his series of papers. Some of the conditions of the discussion appear to have changed in the intervening years; the energy crisis of the late 1970s was clearly
the direct result of political events at the time. The current
worries about peak oil are the result of more fundamental
questions concerning the remaining amounts of what are undeniably finite fossil-fuel resources, along with a world
population that is growing and demanding a share of these
resources. Regardless of the exact timing of peaks in oil or
natural gas production 共or even coal production兲, it is reasonably clear that the students we are teaching now will be
going into retirement in a very different world from the one
they now experience.
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